



Advisory on the Financial Action Task Force-Identified Jurisdictions with Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Deficiencies and Relevant Actions by the United States Government

On June 21, 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) updated its list of jurisdictions with strategic anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) deficiencies. The changes may affect U.S. financial institutions' obligations and risk-based approaches with respect to relevant jurisdictions.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing this advisory to inform financial institutions of updates to the FATF list of jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. Financial institutions should be aware of these changes, which may affect their obligations and risk-based approaches with respect to these jurisdictions. The advisory also reminds financial institutions of the status and obligations involving these jurisdictions, in particular the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran.

As part of the FATF's listing and monitoring process to ensure compliance with its international AML/CFT standards, the FATF identifies certain jurisdictions as having strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes.¹ These jurisdictions are named in two documents: (1) the "[FATF Public Statement](#)," which identifies jurisdictions that are subject to the FATF's call for countermeasures and/or enhanced due diligence (EDD) because of their strategic AML/CFT deficiencies; and (2) "[Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process](#)," which identifies jurisdictions that the FATF has determined to have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies.² On June 21, 2019, the FATF updated both documents. Financial institutions should consider these changes when reviewing their obligations and risk-based policies, procedures, and practices with respect to the jurisdictions noted below.³

1. The FATF (www.fatf-gafi.org) is a 39-member intergovernmental body that establishes international standards to combat money laundering and counter the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United States is a member of the FATF.
2. The FATF's public identification of jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies is in response to the G20 leaders' call for the FATF to reinvigorate its process for assessing jurisdictions' compliance with international AML/CFT standards. The G20 leaders have consistently called for the FATF to issue regular updates on jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies. Specifically, within the FATF, the International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) monitors and identifies jurisdictions with AML/CFT deficiencies. For more information on the ICRG procedures, please visit the [FATF's website](#).
3. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(h) and (i).

FATF Public Statement:

- [DPRK](#) and [Iran](#)

FATF Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process:

- [Remaining on the list](#): The Bahamas, Botswana, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Yemen
- [Added to the list](#): Panama
- [Removed from the list](#): Serbia

Jurisdictions that are Subject to the FATF’s Call for Countermeasures and/or EDD Due to their Strategic AML/CFT Deficiencies

The FATF has stated that the following jurisdictions have strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes and has called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to (1) impose countermeasures and/or (2) apply EDD proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction.

Countermeasures

[DPRK](#)

Enhanced Due Diligence

[Iran](#)

Review of Guidance Regarding the DPRK and Iran

DPRK

FATF Actions: Public Statement on the DPRK

The FATF issued the following public statement concerning the DPRK:

“The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/FT/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions.”⁴

United Nations: Related Sanctions on the DPRK

The United Nations (UN) has adopted a number of resolutions implementing economic and financial sanctions, as well as other prohibitions and restrictions with respect to the DPRK. Member States are bound by the provisions of these United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).⁵ Most recently, UNSCR 2397 (2017) called upon Member States to redouble efforts to implement measures in all DPRK-related UNSCRs, and certain provisions of these resolutions are especially relevant to financial institutions. For example, UNSCR 2270 (2016) requires Member States to prohibit financial institutions from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with DPRK banks without advance approval from the UN.

Financial institutions should also be aware of UNSCR 2321 (2016), which states that Member States must expel individuals acting on behalf of or at the direction of a bank or financial institution of the DPRK. UNSCR 2321 also expresses concern that individuals from the DPRK are sent abroad to earn hard currency to fund the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and it reiterates the concern that the DPRK may use bulk cash to evade UN measures. UNSCR 2321 also instructs Member States to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries, or banking accounts in the DPRK within 90 days of the adoption of the resolution (unless individually exempted by the 1718 Committee), and states that Member States shall prohibit public and private financial support within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK.

4. Financial Action Task Force [Public Statement – June 2019](#), (June 21, 2019).

5. Relevant UNSCRs include [2397](#) (December 2017), [2375](#) (September 2017), [2371](#) (August 2017), [2356](#) (June 2017), [2321](#) (November 2016), [2270](#) (March 2016), [2094](#) (March 2013), [2087](#) (January 2013), [1874](#) (June 2009), and [1718](#) (October 2006). See the United Nations Security Council Resolutions [web page](#) for more information.

United States: Related Sanctions, Prohibitions, and Other Measures Concerning the DPRK

In addition to UN sanctions, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains a robust sanctions program on North Korea⁶ through the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 510 (NKSR), which implements DPRK-related Executive Orders (E.O.) 13466, 13551, 13570, 13687, 13722, and 13810; as well as the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (NKSPEA), as amended by Title III of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA).⁷ The NKSR and relevant Executive Orders generally prohibit most direct or indirect commercial, financial, or trade transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction that involve North Korea or the property or interests in property of any individual or entity designated pursuant to the NKSR program unless authorized by OFAC or exempted by statute.⁸ Separately, using authorities granted under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations⁹ and E.O. 13382, OFAC administers sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for the proliferation of WMD, as well as their supporters, some of whom are North Korean or tied to North Korea and North Korean-related activity.¹⁰ Together these sanctions are a direct response to the DPRK’s ongoing development of WMD and their means of delivery; launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles; nuclear tests; human rights abuses and censorship; destructive, coercive cyber-related actions; involvement in money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods and currency, bulk cash smuggling, and narcotics trafficking; and continued violations of UNSCRs.¹¹

Financial institutions should be particularly aware of the extensive nature of the sanctions associated with E.O. 13810.¹² The E.O. provides Treasury additional tools to disrupt a broad range of DPRK-related activity, to include North Korea’s ability to fund its WMD and ballistic missile programs. Specifically, E.O. 13810: (1) establishes several new designation criteria; (2) prohibits vessels and aircraft that have called or landed at a port or place in North Korea in the previous 180 days, and vessels that engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer with such a vessel in the previous 180 days, from entering the United States; (3) provides authority to block any funds to, from, or through accounts with links to North Korea that come within U.S. jurisdiction; and (4) provides

6. The DPRK is also referred to as North Korea.

7. See Treasury Resource Center, [North Korea Sanctions](#), 22 U.S.C. § 9201 et seq., and [Public Law 115-44](#).

8. Further information about these sanctions is available at Treasury Resource Center, North Korea Sanctions and the [OFAC Recent Actions web page](#). OFAC recently designated a Russian financial institution for supporting DPRK-related sanctions evasion on [June 19, 2019](#) and two shipping companies for attempting evasion of sanctions relating to the DPRK on [March 21, 2019](#). Previously, OFAC took sanctions actions related to the DPRK on [December 10, 2018](#); [November 19, 2018](#); [October 25, 2018](#); [October 4, 2018](#); [September 13, 2018](#); [September 6, 2018](#); [August 21, 2018](#); [August 15, 2018](#); [August 3, 2018](#); [February 23, 2018](#); [January 24, 2018](#); [November 21, 2017](#); [October 26, 2017](#); [September 26, 2017](#); [August 22, 2017](#); [December 26, 2017](#); [June 29, 2017](#); [June 1, 2017](#); [March 31, 2017](#); [December 2, 2016](#); and [September 26, 2016](#).

9. See 31 CFR Part 544.

10. See Executive Order [13382](#) (June 28, 2005).

11. See Executive Orders [13810](#) (September 20, 2017), [13687](#) (January 2, 2015), and [13551](#) (August 30, 2010).

12. See Treasury Resource Center, [Issuance of North Korea-related Executive Order; New and Updated FAQs; New and Updated General Licenses](#) (September 21, 2017) and Treasury Press Release, [“Remarks by Secretary Mnuchin on President Trump’s Executive Order on North Korea”](#) (July 23, 2018).

authority to impose sanctions on a foreign financial institution (FFI) that knowingly conducts or facilitates on or after September 21, 2017, (i) any significant transaction on behalf of any person blocked under the DPRK-related E.O.s or persons blocked under E.O. 13382 for North Korea-related activities or (ii) any significant transaction in connection with trade with North Korea. The sanctions applicable to FFIs can be restrictions on correspondent or payable-through accounts or full blocking sanctions.¹³

Since the issuance of E.O. 13810, OFAC has designated entities and individuals involved in North Korea’s illicit shipping and transportation activities, trading companies, and financial and banking representatives, and identified multiple vessels as blocked property.¹⁴ For example, on June 19, 2019, OFAC designated Russian-registered Russian Financial Society pursuant to Section 4 of E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, U.S.-designated Dandong Zhongsheng Industry & Trade Co. Ltd.¹⁵ On March 21, 2019, OFAC designated two China-based shipping companies pursuant to E.O. 13722 and E.O. 13810 that have helped North Korea evade sanctions, and, in a related action, issued an update, along with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Coast Guard, to a sanctions advisory focused on North Korea’s illicit shipping practices, which was initially published in February 2018.¹⁶ The updated advisory provides new information about North Korea’s deceptive shipping practices, additional guidance on how to mitigate the risk of involvement in these practices, a new graphic depicting certain ports of call, and three new annexes.

Other Treasury actions underscore the serious risks that any financial activity involving the DPRK may facilitate WMD and ballistic missile activities. In November 2016, pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, FinCEN issued a final rule prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for, or on behalf of, North Korean banking institutions and requiring covered financial institutions to apply special due diligence to their foreign correspondent accounts that is reasonably designed to guard against the use of such accounts to process transactions involving North Korean financial institutions.¹⁷ FinCEN noted that the North Korean government continues to use state-controlled financial institutions and front companies to conduct illicit international financial transactions, some of which support the proliferation of WMDs and the development of ballistic missiles.¹⁸

13. See OFAC’s Frequently Asked Questions ([FAQs](#)).

14. See Executive Order [13810](#) (September 20, 2017).

15. See Treasury Press Release, “[Treasury Designates Russian Financial Institution Supporting North Korea Sanctions Evasion](#)” (June 19, 2019).

16. See Treasury Press Release, “[Treasury Designates Two Shipping Companies for Attempted Evasion of North Korea Sanctions](#)” (March 21, 2019) and Treasury Resource Center, “[Publication of North Korea Supply Chain Advisory](#)” (July 23, 2018).

17. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.659.

18. *Id.*

In November 2017, FinCEN also prohibited U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for, or on behalf of, Bank of Dandong, and required those covered financial institutions to apply special due diligence to their foreign correspondent accounts that is reasonably designed to guard against their use to process transactions involving Bank of Dandong.¹⁹ In promulgating the regulation, FinCEN found that the Chinese bank has acted as a conduit for illicit North Korean financial activity to access the U.S. and international financial systems, including the facilitation of millions of dollars of transactions for companies involved in WMD and ballistic missile programs. Further, FinCEN found that Bank of Dandong has also facilitated financial activity for North Korean entities designated by the United States and listed by the UN for proliferation of WMD, as well as for front companies acting on their behalf.²⁰

On November 2, 2017, FinCEN also issued an advisory to further alert financial institutions to schemes commonly used by North Korea to evade U.S. and UN sanctions, launder funds, and finance the North Korean regime’s weapons programs.²¹

Iran

FATF Actions: Public Statement on Iran

The FATF issued a public statement concerning Iran. Excerpts from the statement are provided below. To read the public statement in its entirety, please see the Financial Action Task Force’s [Public Statement – June 2019](#).

“Iran’s [A]ction [P]lan expired in January 2018. In June 2019, the FATF noted that there are still items [of Iran’s Action Plan that are] not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups ‘attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism’; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) clarifying that the submission of [Suspicious Transaction Reports] STRs for attempted [Terrorist Financing] TF-related transactions are covered under Iran’s legal framework; (5) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (6) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (7) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.

19. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.660.

20. *Id.*

21. See FinCEN Advisory, [FIN-2017-A008](#), “Advisory on North Korea’s Use of the International Financial System” (November 2017). In addition, FinCEN has issued three other advisories relating to the DPRK: [FIN-2013-A005](#), “Update on the Continuing Illicit Finance Threat Emanating from North Korea” (July 2013); [FIN-2009-A002](#), “North Korea Government Agencies’ and Front Companies’ Involvement in Illicit Financial Activities” (June 2009); and [FinCEN Advisory – Issue 40](#), “Guidance to Financial Institutions on the Provisions of Banking Services to North Korean Government Agencies and Associated Front Companies Engaged in Illicit Activities” (December 2005).

The FATF decided at its meeting this week to continue the suspension of counter-measures, with the exception of the FATF calling upon members and urging all jurisdictions to require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran, in line with the February 2019 Public Statement.

While acknowledging the progress that Iran made including with the passage of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the FATF expresses its disappointment that the Action Plan remains outstanding. The FATF expects Iran to proceed swiftly in the reform path to ensure that it addresses all of the remaining items by completing and implementing the necessary AML/CFT reforms.

If by October 2019, Iran does not enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, then the FATF will require introducing enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran. The FATF also expects Iran to continue to progress with enabling regulations and other amendments.

Iran will remain on the FATF Public Statement until the full Action Plan has been completed. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system. The FATF, therefore, calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to continue to advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence with respect to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons from Iran, consistent with FATF Recommendation 19, including: (1) obtaining information on the reasons for intended transactions; and (2) conducting enhanced monitoring of business relationships, by increasing the number and timing of controls applied, and selecting patterns of transactions that need further examination.”²²

As noted by the FATF, countries that host branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran are directed to undertake increased supervision of those branches and subsidiaries. While this does not affect current regulatory obligations for U.S. financial institutions, all U.S. persons are reminded that they are broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings with Iran, the Government of Iran, and Iranian financial institutions, including opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for Iranian financial institutions (see below for additional details).

United Nations: Related Sanctions on Iran

Financial institutions should be familiar with the requirements and prohibitions contained in UNSCR 2231 related to Iran.²³

22. Financial Action Task Force [Public Statement – June 2019](#) (June 21, 2019).

23. UNSCR [2231](#) (July 2015) revises UN sanctions and other prohibitions, including financial prohibitions, concerning Iran. Financial institutions should be aware that the UN maintains a list of individuals and entities subject to targeted financial sanctions.

United States: Related Sanctions, Prohibitions, and other Measures Related to Iran

The United States has consistently underscored the risks of conducting business with entities associated with Iran. Iran continues to use deceptive tactics, including front and shell companies to exploit markets in numerous jurisdictions, to fund its nefarious activities. Iran’s tactics include forging documents, obfuscating data, and hiding illicit activities under official cover of government entities, among many others. On October 11, 2018, FinCEN issued an advisory outlining the deceptive practices the Iranian regime employs to access the international financial system with the intention of furthering its illicit and malign activities.²⁴

The United States is engaged in a campaign of maximum financial pressure on the Iranian regime and intends to enforce aggressively the sanctions that are in effect. On May 8, 2018, the United States announced its decision to cease its participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to begin re-imposing the U.S. nuclear-related sanctions that were lifted to effectuate the JCPOA sanctions relief, following a wind-down period. Treasury implemented 90-day and 180-day wind-down periods for activities involving Iran that were consistent with the U.S. sanctions relief specified in the JCPOA.²⁵ On August 7, 2018, the United States reimposed certain sanctions that were lifted or waived under the JCPOA, and on November 5, 2018, the United States fully re-imposed those sanctions. These sanctions target critical sectors of Iran’s economy, such as the energy, shipping, shipbuilding, and financial sectors.²⁶ Furthermore, E.O. 13871 of May 8, 2019 imposed sanctions, including correspondent and payable-through account sanctions on foreign financial institutions, related to, among other things, significant transactions for the purchase and sale of iron, steel, aluminum, and copper from Iran.²⁷ In addition, on June 24, 2019, the President signed E.O. 13876, imposing sanctions on the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Supreme Leader’s Office (SLO), and authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on certain affiliates of the Supreme Leader or the SLO.²⁸

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24. See FinCEN Advisory, [FIN-2018-A006](#), “Advisory on the Iranian Regime’s Illicit and Malign Activities and Attempts to Exploit the Financial System” (October 2018). FinCEN has issued numerous additional advisories related to Iran. See [FIN-2019-A001](#), “Advisory on the Financial Action Task Force-Identified Jurisdictions with Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism Deficiencies” (March 2019); [FIN-2018-A007](#), “Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies” (October 2018); [FIN-2018-A004](#), “Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies” (September 2018); [FIN-2018-A002](#), “Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies” (April 2018); [FIN-2010-A008](#), “Update on the Continuing Illicit Finance Threat Emanating from Iran” (June 2010); [FIN-2008-A002](#), “Guidance to Financial Institutions on the Continuing Money Laundering Threat Involving Illicit Iranian Activity” (March 2008); and [FIN-2007-A001](#), “Guidance to Financial Institutions on the Increasing Money Laundering Threat Involving Illicit Iranian Activity” (October 2007).
25. See Treasury Resource Center, [May 2018 Guidance on Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran](#), (November 5, 2018).
26. See Executive Order [13846](#) (August 6, 2018).
27. See Executive Order [13871](#) (May 8, 2019).
28. See Executive Order [13876](#) (June 24, 2019).

Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State, on April 15, 2019, designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including its Qods Force, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.²⁹ This action followed OFAC’s 2017 Treasury designation of the IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing support to the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which was itself designated in 2007 under this same authority for providing support to a number of terrorist groups, including Hizballah and Hamas.³⁰

Additionally, OFAC administers and enforces comprehensive trade sanctions against Iran as set forth in the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), 31 C.F.R. Part 560; Executive Orders, issued under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06; and other authorities. The ITSR generally prohibits most direct or indirect transactions with Iran by U.S. persons or within the United States, unless authorized by OFAC or exempted by statute.³¹

To combat Iran’s malign activities, including its efforts to deceive the international business community, since February 2017 OFAC has issued 29 rounds of designations targeting over 1,000 persons, aircraft, and vessels in connection with a range of activities, including Iran’s support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program, WMD proliferation, cyberattacks, transnational criminal activity, censorship, and human rights abuses.³²

In June 2019, via a series of actions, OFAC imposed sanctions on IRGC-related targets. Most recently, on June 24, 2019, OFAC took action against eight senior commanders of Navy, Aerospace, and Ground Forces of the IRGC; these commanders sit atop a bureaucracy that supervises the IRGC’s malicious regional activities, including its provocative ballistic missile program, harassment and sabotage of commercial vessels in international waters, and its destabilizing presence in Syria.

29. See U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson Fact Sheet, “[Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps](#)” (April 8, 2019).

30. *Id.*

31. The ITSR also prohibit entities owned or controlled by a United States person and established or maintained outside the United States (“U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities”) from knowingly engaging in any transaction directly or indirectly with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran that would be prohibited by the ITSR if the transaction were engaged in by a U.S. person or in the United States.

32. On November 5, 2018, the United States re-imposed the sanctions that were lifted or waived under the JCPOA, and OFAC posted to its website [additional frequently asked questions \(FAQs\)](#) that provide guidance on the sanctions that have been re-imposed, amended several FAQs, and archived outdated FAQs. In addition to sanctions re-imposed by E.O. 13846, OFAC issued Iran-related designations on [June 24, 2019](#); [June 12, 2019](#); [June 7, 2019](#); [March 26, 2019](#); [March 22, 2019](#); [February 13, 2019](#); [January 24, 2019](#); [October 16, 2018](#); [September 14, 2018](#); [July 9, 2018](#); [May 30, 2018](#); [May 24, 2018](#); [May 22, 2018](#); [May 17, 2018](#); [May 15, 2018](#); [May 10, 2018](#); [March 23, 2018](#); [January 12, 2018](#); [January 4, 2018](#); [November 20, 2017](#); and [October 13, 2017](#). Furthermore, OFAC previously issued Iran-related designations associated with Iran’s ballistic missile program on [July 28, 2017](#); [July 18, 2017](#) (in conjunction with those issued by the U.S. Department of State and in coordination with the U.S. Department of Justice’s release of information involving a related criminal enforcement action); [September 14, 2017](#); [May 17, 2017](#); [April 13, 2017](#); and [February 3, 2017](#). Consult OFAC’s [Iran Sanctions web page](#) and the [OFAC Recent Actions web page](#) for more detailed information about the sanctions included in this footnote.

Furthermore, on June 12, 2019, OFAC imposed sanctions on an Iraq-based IRGC-QF financial conduit, South Wealth Resources Company (SWRC), which has trafficked hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of weapons to IRGC-QF-backed Iraqi militias. SWRC and its two Iraqi associates, who were also designated, have covertly facilitated the IRGC-QF's access to the Iraqi financial system to evade sanctions. Finally, on June 7, 2019, OFAC took action against Iran's largest and most profitable petrochemical holding group, Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), for providing financial support to Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (Khatam al-Anbiya), the engineering conglomerate of the IRGC. In addition to PGPIC, OFAC designated PGPIC's vast network of 39 subsidiary petrochemical companies and foreign-based sales agents. The IRGC and its major holdings, such as the Basij Cooperative Foundation and Khatam al-Anbiya, have a dominant presence in Iran's commercial and financial sectors, controlling multi-billion dollar businesses and maintaining extensive economic interests in the defense, construction, aviation, oil, banking, metal, automobile, and mining industries. The profits from these activities support the IRGC's full range of nefarious activities, including the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, support for terrorism, and a variety of human rights abuses, at home and abroad.³³

Review of Guidance on Section 312 Obligation Relating to the DPRK and Iran

Financial institutions must comply with the extensive U.S. restrictions and prohibitions against opening or maintaining any correspondent accounts, directly or indirectly, with foreign banks licensed by the DPRK or Iran.

In the case of the DPRK, existing U.S. sanctions and FinCEN regulations already prohibit any such correspondent account relationships, superseding the Section 312 obligations.

In the case of Iran, the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions remain persons whose property and interests in property are blocked under E.O. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR. U.S. financial institutions and other U.S. persons continue to be broadly prohibited under the ITSR from engaging in transactions or dealings with Iran, the Government of Iran, and Iranian financial institutions, including opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for Iranian financial institutions. These sanctions impose obligations on U.S. persons that go beyond the obligations imposed under Section 312.

33. See OFAC actions on [June 24, 2019](#); [June 12, 2019](#); and [June 7, 2019](#).

Reminder of General 312 Obligations

As a general matter, FinCEN reminds U.S. financial institutions of their duty to apply enhanced due diligence when maintaining correspondent accounts for foreign banks operating under a banking license issued by a country (1) designated as non-cooperative with respect to international anti-money laundering principles or procedures, by an intergovernmental group or organization of which the United States is a member, and with which designation the U.S. representative to the group or organization concurs, or (2) that is the subject of special measures pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act.³⁴

The regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, require covered financial institutions to ensure that their enhanced due diligence programs include, at a minimum, steps to:

- Conduct enhanced scrutiny of such correspondent accounts to guard against money laundering and to identify and report any suspicious transactions in accordance with applicable law and regulation;
- Determine whether the foreign bank for which the correspondent account is established or maintained in turn maintains correspondent accounts for other foreign banks that use the foreign correspondent account established or maintained by the covered financial institution and, if so, take reasonable steps to obtain information relevant to assess and mitigate money laundering risks associated with the foreign bank's correspondent accounts for other foreign banks, including, as appropriate, the identity of those foreign banks; and
- Determine, for any such correspondent account established or maintained for a foreign bank whose shares are not publicly traded, the identity of each owner of the foreign bank and the nature and extent of each owner's ownership interest.³⁵

Jurisdictions Identified by the FATF as Having Strategic AML/CFT Deficiencies

The FATF publicly identifies jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT regime deficiencies for which the jurisdictions have developed an action plan with the FATF. Consequently, these jurisdictions are included in the following list of jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, as described in the FATF's publication entitled "[Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process.](#)"

34. Referring to 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i), 31 CFR §§ 1010.610(b) and (c) (Enhanced Due Diligence obligations for correspondent accounts established, maintained, administered or managed in the United States for certain foreign banks).

35. *Id.*

- The Bahamas, Botswana, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Yemen.

Summary of Changes

Jurisdiction Added to the List

- Panama has been added to the list due to the lack of effective implementation of its AML/CFT framework. Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and the relevant FATF Style Regional Body (the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America – GAFILAT) to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime.

Jurisdictions Removed from the List

- Serbia has been removed from the list and is no longer subject to the FATF’s monitoring process under its ongoing global AML/CFT compliance process. The FATF stated that Serbia made significant progress to improve the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan. Serbia will continue to work with the relevant FATF Style Regional Body (The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism – MONEYVAL) to improve further its AML/CFT regime and continue to address the full range of AML/CFT issues identified in its mutual evaluation report.

Review of Guidance Regarding Jurisdictions Having Strategic AML/CFT Deficiencies

U.S. financial institutions also should consider the risks associated with the AML/CFT deficiencies of the jurisdictions identified under this section (The Bahamas, Botswana, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Yemen).³⁶ With respect to these jurisdictions, U.S. covered financial institutions are reminded of their obligations to comply with the due diligence obligations for FFIs under 31 CFR § 1010.610(a) in addition to their general obligations under 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) and its implementing regulations.³⁷ As required under 31 CFR § 1010.610(a), covered financial

36. This advisory updates previous FATF-related guidance on identified jurisdictions with AML/CFT deficiencies. Additional FinCEN advisories on Syria include [FIN-2013-A002](#) and [FIN-2011-A010](#) as well as [FIN-2011-A013](#), FinCEN’s advisory on the Commercial Bank of Syria.

37. See generally 31 CFR § 1010.210: Anti-money laundering programs. Specific AML Program obligations are prescribed in 31 CFR § 1020.210 (Banks), 1021.210 (Casinos and Card Clubs), 1022.210 (Money Services Businesses), 1023.210 (Brokers or Dealers in Securities), 1024.210 (Mutual Funds), 1025.210 (Insurance Companies), 1026.210 (Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities), 1027.210 (Dealers in Precious Metals, Precious Stones, or Jewels), 1028.210 (Operators of Credit Card Systems), 1029.210 (Loan or Finance Companies), and 1030.210 (Housing Government Sponsored Enterprises).

institutions should ensure that their due diligence programs, which address correspondent accounts maintained for FFIs, include appropriate, specific, risk-based, and, where necessary, enhanced policies, procedures, and controls that are reasonably designed to detect and report known or suspected money laundering activity conducted through or involving any correspondent account established, maintained, administered, or managed in the United States. Furthermore, money services businesses (MSBs) are reminded of their parallel requirements with respect to foreign agents or foreign counterparties, as described in FinCEN Interpretive Release 2004-1, which clarifies that an MSB's AML Program requires the MSB to establish adequate and appropriate policies, procedures, and controls commensurate with the risk of money laundering and the financing of terrorism posed by their relationship with foreign agents or foreign counterparties (69 FR 239, Dec.14, 2004). Additional information on these parallel requirements (covering both domestic and foreign agents, and foreign counterparts) may be found in FinCEN's Guidance on Existing AML Program Rule Compliance Obligations for MSB Principals with Respect to Agent Monitoring.³⁸ Such reasonable steps should not, however, put into question a financial institution's ability to maintain or otherwise continue appropriate relationships with customers or other financial institutions, and should not be used as the basis to engage in wholesale or indiscriminate de-risking of any class of customers or financial institutions. FinCEN also reminds financial institutions of previous interagency guidance on providing services to foreign embassies, consulates, and missions.³⁹

AML Program Risk Assessment: For the jurisdictions that were removed from the FATF listing and monitoring process, financial institutions should take the FATF's decisions and the reasons behind the delisting into consideration when assessing risk, consistent with their obligations under 31 CFR §§ 1010.610(a) and 1010.210.

Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs): If a financial institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that a transaction involves funds derived from illegal activity or that a customer has otherwise engaged in activities indicative of money laundering, terrorist financing, or other violation of federal law or regulation, the financial institution must file a SAR.

38. See [FIN-2016-G001](#) (March 11, 2016).

39. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, "[Interagency Advisory: Guidance on Accepting Accounts from Foreign Embassies, Consulates, and Missions](#)," March 24, 2011; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, "[Interagency Advisory: Guidance on Accepting Accounts from Foreign Governments, Foreign Embassies, and Foreign Political Figures](#)," June 15, 2004.

SAR Filing Instructions

When filing a SAR, financial institutions should provide all pertinent available information in the SAR form and narrative. **FinCEN requests financial institutions only use the updated mandatory SAR form (as of February 1, 2019) and reference this advisory in SAR field 2 (Filing Institution Note to FinCEN) by including the following key term: “July 2019 FATF FIN-2019-A004”** to indicate a connection between the suspicious activity being reported and the jurisdictions and activities highlighted in this advisory.

SAR reporting, in conjunction with effective implementation of due diligence requirements and OFAC obligations by financial institutions, has been crucial to identifying proliferation financing, other financial crimes associated with foreign and domestic political corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing. SAR reporting is consistently beneficial and critical to FinCEN and U.S. law enforcement analytical and investigative efforts, OFAC designation efforts, and the overall security and stability of the U.S. financial system.

For Further Information

Questions or comments regarding the contents of this advisory should be addressed to the FinCEN Regulatory Support Section at frc@fincen.gov.

Financial institutions wanting to report suspicious transactions that may potentially relate to terrorist activity should call the Financial Institutions Toll-Free Hotline at (866) 556-3974 (7 days a week, 24 hours a day). The purpose of the hotline is to expedite the delivery of this information to law enforcement. Financial institutions should immediately report any imminent threat to local-area law enforcement officials.

The mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is to safeguard the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering, and promote national security through the strategic use of financial authorities and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence.